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Abstract 
There is currently no agreed comprehensive methodology on how to track and report on public 
climate finance. As a result, national actors need to agree on their own methodologies. In this 
working paper, we report on the result of the support the researchers offered to the Belgian 
actors that are (or could be) active in the provision of public climate finance to developing 
countries.  
In a second part of the working paper, the results are described of the process of supporting 
one Belgian actor, Credendo, on a more in-depth level. Recommendations are made for future 
reporting processes, both for Credendo and for the whole of the Belgian stakeholders active in 
this field.  
JEL Classification: F35, Q56 
Keywords: Public climate finance, private climate finance, Credendo, Rio markers, tracking 
climate finance, developing countries, UNFCCC
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1 |  Introduction 
 Background  
In the past few years, and especially since 2011 when the first Fast-Start finance Reports were 
issued, significant improvements have been made in promoting a more transparent and robust 
framework for the reporting of financial resources provided to developing countries by 
developed countries. Current UNFCCC modalities include National Communications (NCs) (every 
four years) and Biennial Reports (BRs) (every two years) for developed country Parties (esp. 
Annex II Parties); and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) for developing country Parties.  Developed 
countries also need to report financial information on their official development assistance 
(ODA) for climate purposes yearly to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In 
the EU, Members States also report information via the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation.   
Reporting guidelines and parties’ reporting practices have also markedly improved over time. 
National Communications’ guidelines (FCCC/CP/1999/7) require developed country Parties to 
report information on measures taken to fulfil their commitments under Article 4 of the 
Convention, including a definition of what counts as “new and additional” resources. The 
Biennial reporting process reinforced existing modalities by providing a Common Tabular Format 
(CTF) (See Decision 19/CP.18) which requires parties to provide even more detailed information 
on their financial support, including information on the definitions and methodologies selected 
during the reporting process.    
The Paris Agreement, in its Article 9, strengthens developed country parties’ obligation to 
provide financial support to developing countries, and encourages advanced developing 
countries to start providing such resources and communicate related information. The 
agreement also provides for revised CTF (Decision 9/CP.21) which compels Annex II parties to 
provide more detailed and specific information on climate finance provided and to report 
information on the private climate finance mobilised by a variety of public interventions.  Note 
that all country Parties to the UNFCCC are currently involved in setting up new modalities for 
the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised in accordance with article 9, 
paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement.
1
  
Despite continuing efforts, both under and outside the Convention, to improve existing 
procedures and modalities, data on public climate finance still lacks the desirable level of 
consistency, accuracy, and transparency. Many gaps and challenges remain, chief among them, 
the persisting lack of common understanding of key definitions and methodologies that are 
crucial to a comprehensive reporting process (i.e. climate finance, new and additional, 
 
1 For the authentic text of the  Paris Agreement see: 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf 
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concessionality). In addition, OECD members tend to apply the Rio Marker methodology 
differently using differing weighting methods in the tracking of their climate-relevant flows. On 
the whole, the lack of common methods and definitions has led to a variety of accounting 
systems that differ in terms of points of measurement, data coverage, recipient definitions, 
format of data reported, tracking and quantification methods, thereby significantly hampering 
the comparability and usefulness of the data reported. Information gaps do persist as well, 
especially in regard to public bilateral climate finance embedded in multilateral institutions and 
in regard to multilateral climate flows more generally. Finally, the current system cannot ensure 
a coherent tracking and measuring of private climate finance mobilised through public 
interventions. Despite relevant methodological work undertaken by the OECD Research 
Collaborative, parties are still investigating how to effectively and adequately track their efforts 
to mobilise private climate finance in developing countries.
2
  
Overall, these concerns have led to the increasing recognition even among developed 
countries, of the importance of an improved tracking and representation of data on climate 
finance provided and mobilised. However and in the persisting absence at the international level 
of commonly agreed accounting and reporting modalities, substantial efforts should be directed 
toward improving the clarity, transparency, and comprehensiveness of climate finance 
measuring, tracking and reporting at the national level. This is of particular importance for those 
developed country Parties that have a relatively complex and highly diverse landscape of 
relevant climate finance providers. Such is the situation in Belgium, a country featuring various 
public actors with relevant climate finance flows, operating in different sectors (e.g. 
development cooperation, environment and climate and, investment and export) and at 
different levels of governments (federal and regional). The main challenge with such a varied 
and multileveled institutional structure is that it can easily map out onto a climate finance 
reporting system that lacks consistency, transparency, and common definitions and 
methodologies. 
 Objectives and structure of the study  
This study was conducted in the context of the Belgian Policy Research Group on Financing for 
Development (BeFinD). It presents a number of key recommendations on how to improve the 
comprehensiveness of the climate finance reporting system in Belgium. This collaborative work 
directly follows up on a previous BeFinD study (2026) co-authored by Lize Van Dyck and Kris 
Bachus on Public Climate Finance in Belgium which provided a comprehensive overview of all 
official climate-related development finance in Belgium for the years 2013-2014. It also, albeit 
less directly, builds on a Trinomics study (2015) which assessed which actors in Belgium are 
potentially relevant for the mobilisation of private climate finance to developing countries and 
 
2 In regard to mobilised private climate finance, relevant methodological work is currently being undertaken within the framework 
of The Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance. This research group is a OECD-hosted consortium of experts from 
international financial institutions, the private sector, governments, and non-governmental organizations that is working to develop 
tools for more accurately tracking mobilized private climate finance. See the Research Collaborative’s website for further 
information: https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative.  
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which provided a preliminary quantitative assessment of Belgium’s public climate finance and 
mobilised private climate finance for the years 2013-2014.  
In their findings and recommendations, the two studies both emphasise the need to provide 
further guidance and support to Belgian actors on how to provide more transparent, comparable 
and accurate information on their climate-relevant flows in the future. Essentially, achieving a 
more comprehensive and transparent reporting system at both national and regional levels can 
serve as the basis for conducting proper analysis and assessments on the progress made by 
Belgium towards achieving its international climate finance commitments to developing 
countries.   
Note that as agreed with DGD (the Belgian Directorate General for Development and 
Cooperation), which is the commissioner of this study, the recommendations provided here 
mainly focus on the reporting of climate finance provided (i.e. public climate finance), and not 
on mobilised private climate finance through public interventions. However, and for reasons 
related to the private nature of some climate flows, the case study on Delcredere|Ducroire 
(Credendo), Belgium’s export credit agency, focuses principally on the organisation’s role in 
mobilising private climate finance in developing countries.   
It is crucial to note that three main issues have guided our analytical approach. The first one is 
the need to promote at the national level common and conservative definitions, methodologies 
and reporting practices at both the national and regional levels. Achieving greater consistency 
and commonality among all Belgian actors is key to ensure adequate comparability and 
accountability of the data provided. In this regard, a cautious and conservative approach should 
be adopted in order to minimise the risks of over-estimation of flows and double-counting, 
taking into account the lack of agreed definitions and methodologies on the international. The 
second concern has to do with improving the transparency and accountability of the Belgian 
climate finance reporting system. While  progress has been made in recent years by the Flemish 
actors in particular to increase the transparency of their climate-relevant data, all Belgian actors 
need to provide more explicit and accessible explanations or justifications on what they decide 
to count and report as climate finance. A third issue has to do with providing adequate 
opportunities for cooperation and/or coordination and sharing on experiences among Belgian 
actors on various issues related to public climate finance reporting. In the absence of common 
definitions and methodologies, it is important that Belgian actors have the opportunities to 
share experiences and practices, and learn from each other’s challenges and successes.   
The set of recommendations that follows concerns different components of the reporting of 
public climate finance. They result from two interrelated research activities conducted from 
September to December 2016.   
(1) A policy workshop on Public Climate Finance Reporting in Belgium.  
On September 27th, 2016, the HIVA Research Institute on Work and Society, the Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance Studies (GGS) and the Belgian Directorate General for Development 
Cooperation (DGD) jointly organised a one-day workshop on climate finance reporting in 
Belgium. The workshop provided an opportunity for the relevant climate finance providers in 
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Belgium to share experiences, challenges, and lessons learnt so to improve climate finance 
reporting at the institutional, regional, and national levels. This event also enabled to more 
clearly identify common and specific challenges and needs of Belgian actors to be addressed 
through joint action and/or tailor-made support and guidance.  See Annex 1 for a description of 
climate finance providers in Belgium.  
(2) The provision of tailor-made advice and guidance to representatives of Delcredere 
|Ducroire, especially in the identification of their climate-relevant flows, accounting method(s), 
and the use of the Rio marker methodology.  
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2 |  Public Climate Finance reporting in Belgium: challenges 
and recommendations  
 Policy workshop on climate finance reporting by Belgian actors: key 
lessons learned  
The following key suggestions were made during the September 2016 Policy Workshop on Public 
Climate Finance Reporting in Belgium. Actors with relevant climate-finance flows:  
 Need to start reporting on private climate finance mobilised through various public 
interventions; relatedly, there is a need to adapt current databases to include private 
climate finance data. 
 Need to take into consideration the principle of additionality despite the absence of a 
common baseline and current conditions of decreasing ODA flows.  
 Better to focus on the disbursement level than on the commitment level in order to 
avoid risks of double counting and improve international comparability.  
 Need to inform BE actors about how to better use the Rio Marker methodology 
especially for the ‘tagging’ of flows and specific projects that do not have a clear climate 
change objective.  
 The need is felt for more coordination of tracking and reporting activities at the Walloon 
level (potential role for AWAC?).  
 No need for more (formal) national coordination. However, a need to encourage the 
sharing of reporting experiences and challenges among BE actors through -for example- 
the organization of a yearly workshop/reporting exercise where BE actors can 
communicate their figures, verify their data, share their challenges, and learn from each 
other’s experiences.  
 The adoption of a common methodology or a common baseline for additionality is not 
an urgent matter and might be very challenging. This however, may become necessary 
when the regions will have greater financial responsibilities from 2020 onwards.  
We note that the conservative approach we put forward as a guiding principle for Belgian 
climate finance reporting (see section 1.2), was shared (and already implemented) by all actors 
present on the workshop.  
 Public climate finance reporting and the principle of ‘new and additional 
financing’  
 Challenge: difficulty of defining what constitutes new and additional financing  
Many concerns were raised during the workshop about the difficulties of applying the principle 
of additionality especially under conditions of decreased ODA flows. Moreover, in the absence 
of a common baseline, it is very difficult to put the principle into practice. Currently, developed 
countries use different definitions of what constitutes new and additional climate funding which 
makes it almost impossible to compare national efforts.  
An interesting point noted by the latest BeFinD paper (2016) is that different interpretations 
of the principle of “new and additional” have led to different practices by some BE actors. The 
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study found that in contrast to the Flemish and federal organisations, which report their public 
climate finance contributions to the Adaptation Fund (AF) as ODA, both the Walloon Region, and 
Brussels Capital Region have marked their climate resources extended to the AF as OOF (i.e. 
€ 250.000 contribution by the Walloon Region to the Adaptation Fund and € 500.000 
contribution by the Brussels Capital Region to the Adaptation Fund) and this mainly because of 
the additionality requirement (p. 53/54). For other actors, such as FIT and FWO, the BeFinD 
researchers marked their flows as OOF not because of the additionality requirement but simply 
because their funding does not have the economic welfare and development of the targeted 
developing countries as their primary objective. Note as well that these different interpretations 
of what counts as OOF or as “new and additional” might become even more salient when BIO 
and Delcredere start reporting their climate-relevant flows.  
 Recommendation: While it remains difficult to adopt a common BE baseline, BE actors 
need to acknowledge the importance of the principle of “new and additional” financing in 
their reporting process.   
Notwithstanding the difficulties of determining what may constitute new and additional finance 
in the BE context, it was recommended to take the principle of ‘new and additional financing’ 
into consideration in the context of future reporting efforts and this for a few reasons: first, the 
principle is very important for developing countries which often use it as a tactical tool during 
international negotiations. Second, and as noted by a representative of DGD, international 
reviewers pay particular attention to how the principle has been applied in the NCs and the BRs 
and BE has been quite heavily criticised in the past for not adequately demonstrating the new 
and additional nature of the climate finance provided to developing countries. Last but not least, 
continuing efforts to establish a common/single baseline for this principle is of crucial 
importance for the comparability of national contributions towards the 100bn goal. Current 
UNFCCC work on establishing new accounting and reporting modalities under the Paris 
Agreement (PA) could soon provide us with a common baseline. As well known, most developing 
countries have long favoured the definition that refers to funds in excess of the 0.7% of Gross 
National Income contribution to ODA (Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006; Oxfam 2009; 
Stadelmann et al. 2010). Other commonly referenced definitions include: funds in excess of ODA 
levels from a specified baseline year; funds in excess of projected future ODA levels; or finance 
that focuses on climate change but is not reported as ODA.
3
 
 Public climate finance and the requirement of concessionality  
 
 Challenge: no agreed definition of concessionality under the UNFCCC  
The current accounting modalities under the UNFCCC require parties to report whether finance 
is “concessional” or “non-concessional”. There is, however, no agreed definition of 
“concessionality” under the UNFCCC, which makes it possible for parties to use different 
 
3 For a summary of the information on "new and additional" definitions used by developed countries in their first 
Biennial Reports (2014), see UNFCCC SCF (2014, p. 57-58). 
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definitions of the concessional level of finance provided. In addition, while some Annex II parties 
only report concessional public climate flows (ODA), other parties also report non-concessional 
finance (OOF). In a table summarising the diversity of approaches used by Annex II Parties in 
accounting and reporting climate finance for the years 2013-2014, Weikmans (2015) for instance 
shows that while some countries including Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United States reported both ODA and OOF climate-related 
flows, while other parties only reported ODA-related climate finance.
4
  
 
 BE actors should agree on a common method to calculate the concessionality of public 
climate finance 
It is recommended that BE actors in their reporting efforts clearly explain how they have 
identified finance as concessional or non-concessional. The unwritten rule in BE is to count as 
public climate finance, finance that is provided to developing countries with a minimum grant 
equivalence of above 0% (or clearly at more generous terms than prevailing market terms). Note 
that under the new OECD DAC reporting system, the calculation of the grant equivalent, which 
measures the concessionality of ODA loans is now based on differentiated discount rates and 
concessionality requirements for lower and middle countries in an effort to better reflect the 
donor’s borrowing costs and risks of providing finance to different country groups.
5
 This 
modernisation helps to capture the “actual” economic value of a loan in ODA more accurately. 
Moreover, it provides a more realistic comparison of loans and grants and incentivises the use 
of grants, which have a higher degree of concessionality than loans.  
 Tracking climate finance and the Rio marker methodology  
 
 Main challenge: difficulties in using the Rio marker methodology  
The Rio marker methodology has proved very useful in tracking and weighting the climate-
relevance of funded projects. It has been used by most Annex I-countries for their Biennial 
reports (OECD 2015). The method is described in details in previous BeFinD studies (Bachus et 
al. 2015, Van Dyck and Bachus 2016, see Box 1).  
Box 1: The Rio Marker methodology and the weighting options in BE: (modified from Van Dyck 
and Bachus 2016).  
The OECD-DAC has developed 2 markers for evaluating the climate-relevance of financial flows, 
i.e. the adaptation and the mitigation markers and three scoring components: 0, 1, or 2. If a 
project has no climate-related objectives, then a score of 0 will be attributed. If a project has 
 
4 These countries include: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See Weikmans 2015, p. 14. The table provided by the author is 
modified from OECD-CPI 2015, p. 43; 45-46.  
5
 See OECD 2014a and b. Note that before the 2014 DAC’s overhauled treatment of loans in ODA, the entire amount 
of the loan (with a grant element of at least 25% calculated on the basis of a fixed 10% benchmark discount rate) was 
counted as ODA (the whole loan was counted as ODA not only the grant element). 
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climate adaptation and/or mitigation as its principal objective, a score of two will be granted. It 
will be marked as 1 when climate adaptation or mitigation are not the principal aim of the 
project but are still significant. Note that the Rio marker methodology was not developed for 
quantification reasons. It was developed primarily to assess whether (ODA) projects should be 
marked as climate-relevant or not (Bachus et al. 2015).   
However, the use of the Rio Markers has one major discussion point, which is related to the 
weighting of the flows in order to get an aggregated estimate for the total climate flows. For the 
activities marked ‘0’ or ‘2’, the weighting issue generates no discussion:  
• If an activity is marked ‘2’ (principal), climate flows are accounted for 100%, and the whole 
sum is taken into account for calculating total climate flows.  
• If the activity has a marker ‘0’ (not an objective), logically 0% of the flow is labelled as climate 
finance.  
However, for the activities marked ‘1’ (climate is not the principle, but still a significant 
objective), multiple options are available with regard to the weighting. Although several 
countries use different practices and weighting methods with regard to the treatment of the ‘1’ 
markers (see OECD 2015 p. 48-49 for an overview of these different weighting methods), two 
main options are used within the Belgian context:  
Method 1: 0-40-100: The European Commission and the Flemish actors have decided to use the 
following weighting method:  
• 0 % if the activity scores 0 on both the mitigation and adaptation marker  
• 40 % if the activity scores 1 on one of the markers  
• 100% if the activity scores 2 on one of the markers  
If a project marks on “1” for both mitigation and adaptation, only 40% in total is counted as 
climate finance (20% mitigation and 20% adaptation), to avoid double counting. Flanders does 
this by categorizing the activity as cross-cutting (both mitigation and adaptation), rather than 
marking it both on mitigation and adaptation.  
Method 2: DGD method: The Federal Development Cooperation administration (DGD) has 
developed its own weighting method based on sector and subsector codes which are attributed 
to each project. In total, there are 101 categories. The rationale behind this weighting method 
‘sui generis’ is to avoid overvaluation of the 40% which is attributed to the “1” marker in the 
Flemish and EU systems. This weighting method has been developed for all Rio Markers 
(including desertification and biodiversity), in order to avoid double counting. If a project scores 
1 on mitigation or adaptation, the sector code will define the percentage of the budget that can 
be allocated as climate finance. In practice, the total percentage allocated to the total of the two 
climate-related Rio markers rarely exceeds 40% of the flow. As a result, the DGD method mostly 
leads to significantly lower total climate flows than method 1.  
During the workshop, it was noted that many if not most BE actors have difficulties measuring 
the climate-relevance of projects that do not have a primary or highly significant objective. This 
is especially the case for BE actors whose activities have no explicit environmental/climate 
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change agenda like those operating in the financial/investment sector. The weighting of flows 
appears also difficult for projects with conflicting objectives, such as for projects with both 
potential beneficial and potential detrimental effects on the environment. In general, many BE 
actors, despite their willingness to provide climate finance data, are not yet familiar with how 
to put the Rio marker methodology into practice. Some are also confronted with large 
administrative burdens in retrieving the relevant data from their databases.   
 Recommendations:  
Use a conservative/cautious approach in using the Rio Marker/and weighting methods so as 
to minimise the risks of inflated figures.   
While the 0-40-100 weighting method is less flexible than the DGD method for the marking of 
“secondary” flows, it is easier to use, and better suited for international comparison. The choice 
of the weighting method ultimately depends on the type of data available and their level of 
detail. In practice indeed, actors using the DGD method might be more inclined to mark a project 
with a Rio Marker ‘1’ instead of ‘0’ since the method allows for greater flexibility when applying 
the weighting factors afterwards. When evaluating the climate relevance of projects that have 
many objectives or potentially different impacts (such as socio-economic, environmental, 
political) BE actors are advised to focus on the net climate change dimension of the project, and 
not on the other environmental impacts; and this whether the project has a climate-related 
objective or not.  
Overall, it is recommended that all Belgian actors adopt a conservative/cautious approach to 
reporting, one that favours transparency and avoids the risks of over-reporting flows. After all, 
any reported flow (including details on the project) will be open for scrutiny, and any doubt on 
the legitimacy of a reported flow can turn against Belgium and undermine our country’s 
credibility regarding climate finance and its reporting. In practice, this required transparency on 
the project level might induce some BE actors who are unsure about the climate-relevance of 
some of their flows, to limit their climate finance reporting. In some cases, compromises will 
need to be sought in an attempt to reconcile the principles of completeness, transparency and 
confidentiality.  
Provide training to some public BE actors about the use of the Rio marker methodology  
Some BE actors might greatly benefit from receiving some training on how to use the Rio 
Markers, especially actors that have no explicit environmental/climate change agenda.  
Need to ensure transparency on the weighting options used by actors in their reporting efforts  
In order to achieve more transparency in the reporting of climate flows, BE actors are advised 
to explicitly explain which weighting options they used. This has been done already by the 
Flemish region which provides a detailed description of the 0-40-100 weighting method on their 
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website.
6 
Likewise, DGD now provides transparency by agreeing to include their list of weighting 
coefficients in the annex of the previous BeFinD (2016) paper on public climate finance in BE.  
Adoption of a common weighting method (?)  
In the near future, and in order to improve the comparability of data provided by all BE actors, 
it might be advisable to set forth a common weighting methodology (i.e. the DGD or the 0-40-
100 method) for all public BE actors. To this end, it may prove useful as a first step, to organise 
a workshop gathering all relevant climate finance providers in BE to share experience and 
practices on the application of the Rio marker methodology and the weighting methods and to 
discuss ideas on the best way forward.   
 Points of measurement  
Public climate finance can be reported at three distinct points of measurement: when funds are 
pledged (when there is a verbal or signed indication of intent to provide the funding), at the 
point of commitment (when it is earmarked and/or transferred from the contributor/investor 
into the account of the recipient/intermediary) or at the point of disbursement (when the funds 
have been deposited by the recipient or intermediary). These various points of measurement 
can lead to double-counting of flows. For instance, the same finance may be reported twice by 
different actors depending on their perspectives on what these various measurement points 
might mean in practice.  
 Recommendation: better to focus on the disbursement level than on the commitment 
level in order to avoid risks of double counting and improve international comparability.  
This recommendation might not be technically feasible for all types of flows. In practice, we 
suggest BE actors to remain vigilant and exercise due diligence when funds are initially reported 
as committed. A double “reporting” system could be put in place, one for funds reported at their 
point of commitment and one that tracks the disbursements that follow up on commitments. 
 Accounting methodology (i.e. valuation of public finance instruments)  
 
 Main challenge: technically difficult to value non-grant instruments  
Public climate finance can be provided via a variety of financial instruments. If the valuation of 
the funds provided through grants is rather straightforward and easy (i.e. equal to the total sum 
of the initial finance provided), the valuation of non-grant instruments such as loans, 
guarantees, mezzanine finance and equity is technically challenging. To date, most developed 
countries account for all financial instruments at their cash face value, a calculation method 
which tends to inflate figures related to loans and other non-grant instruments and hence 
 
6 The detailed list of the efforts of the Government of Flanders on international climate finance since 2013 is available online at:  
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1kypWZ0x6nKicy6V0Ccch4JLTsPhHXQkprXbWE_2nVEM/edit?pref=2&pli=1#gid=0 
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weakens the validity and reliability of the data. This in this context that there is an increasing 
recognition of the importance of introducing a grant equivalent (GE) methodology for non-grant 
instruments. The calculation of the GE of non-grant instruments by representing the 
concessionality level of the funds provided, better enables to capture the donor effort in 
providing public climate finance and provides for a more realistic comparison between grant 
and non-grant instruments. The problem, however, is that this calculation is technically 
challenging for financial instruments with uncertain or unclear financial terms (i.e. maturity 
period, interest rates, risk-adjusted rate of returns, expected financial returns/repayments, 
sovereign and commercial risks). In the previous BeFinD study on public climate finance, it was 
for this reason not possible to calculate the grant equivalent for the loans we detected. 
However, the authors of the study still advise to use the grant equivalent method where 
possible.
7
    
 Recommendations:  
Efforts should be taken to consistently report the actual support effort  
(i) Whenever possible, flows should be reported in GE   
In order to ensure greater clarity and transparency of the data on climate finance provided (and 
mobilised), it is recommended to value whenever possible, the net support value of 
disbursements, expressed by the grant equivalent of what is provided (or mobilised). In the 
absence of adequate modalities under the UNFCCC for the calculation of the grant equivalent of 
loans and other financial instruments, BE actors should agree on a common methodology at the 
national level. To this end, it might be useful to draw on the ongoing work within the OECD DAC. 
In 2014, at their High Level Meeting, members of the OECD DAC decided to change the 
measurement of loans from net flows to risk-differentiated grant equivalents.
8
 In 2016, they 
subsequently proposed new measurement methods to improve the representation of the donor 
effort involved in using other non-grant instruments in external development finance (i.e. 
guarantees, mezzanine finance, and equity). This modernisation process can be useful for the 
reporting of climate finance although more research is needed to ensure the technical feasibility 
and implications of these proposals in the context of public climate finance reporting.
9
   
(ii) Or on net cash flows or GE calculated ex post  
When the GE calculation cannot be conducted for lack of adequate or reliable data, or because 
it is too technically challenging, BE actors should at the very least try to report net cash flows 
whereby disbursements from initial investments are reported as positive climate finance and 
amounts received from divestments or back flows are later reported as negative climate finance. 
When the maturity period and the availability of data allows it, it is still preferable to report 
flows on the basis of the GE calculated ex post (see Bachus and Bécault, 2017).  
 
7 Van Dyck and Bachus 2016 
8
 See OECD 2014a and b. Note that before the 2014 DAC’s overhauled treatment of loans in ODA, the entire amount 
of the loan (with a grant element of at least 25% calculated on the basis of a fixed 10% benchmark discount rate) was 
counted as ODA (the whole loan was counted as ODA not only the grant element).  
9 This point was also mentioned by the authors of the Trinomics study 2015, p. 61.   
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 Aggregation level of the data  
 Challenge: Aggregated data/lack of detailed information hinders the verifiability and 
comparability of the data  
The reporting of public climate finance can be done in very different levels of details ranging 
from the provision of project-level data to the provision of information on only the total amount 
of funds provided by a specific country, with little information on the beneficiaries or sectors 
affected. The lack of disaggregated data or details hinders the comprehensiveness, verifiability, 
accountability, and comparability of the information provided. [Furthermore, since the 
multilateral assessment process of BRs excludes any questions pertaining financial information, 
there is no possibility of cross-checking the information presented by developed country Parties 
in a transparent manner.] Granular, disaggregate information can serve as a counterbalance to 
the lack of precise definitions in some cases and could enhance comparability and avoid double 
counting. Also, it has the potential to foster engagement between donor and recipient countries.  
Recommendation: Provide project-level information when possible  
To enhance the transparency of the data, and to allow the verification and evaluation of finance 
by recipient countries, communities, researchers, and observers organisations, as well as proper 
assessment on progress towards meeting their commitments, BE actors should strive to report 
their flows on a project-by-project level/ or to provide highly disaggregate information on their 
reports, ideally with project-level data and figures. As noted during the workshop however, the 
provision of disaggregated date/figures can be difficult for certain BE actors constrained or 
bound by confidentiality agreements or concerns (e.g. financial/commercial agencies). The 
provision of project-level data may be costly and time-consuming for actors that provide funds 
in the form of small subsidies to companies abroad. In such cases, it was suggested that the 
reporting can take place at the level of the financial instrument or at the aggregate level rather 
than at the project level. 
 Other issues:   
Knowledge sharing and cooperation:  
The two studies on public climate finance called for improved coordination and cooperation 
among BE actors on climate finance reporting (provided and mobilised). Since then, two 
knowledge sharing initiatives have been created:  
1) The September 2016 policy workshop on public climate finance reporting in BE gave relevant 
climate finance providers in BE the opportunity to share experiences and challenges and discuss 
further avenues for cooperation and coordination.   
2) In 2016, an informal working group was created on the federal level by DGD and FPS 
Environment on the issue of climate finance which met a few times already during 2016. In this 
process, FPS Environment has emerged as a coordinator of private climate finance reporting by 
federal actors.   
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During the policy workshop, participants suggested to focus on improving coordination and 
cooperation at the Walloon level and to provide a yearly platform where all BE actors can meet 
to communicate their data and figures, share their experiences and challenges, and learn from 
each other. Note that 2017 is an important year in terms of climate finance reporting: both the 
BRs and the NCs are due that year (end of August) and some BE actors have agreed for the first 
time to try to provide climate-relevant finance data.  
Given the already existing coordination initiatives, the creation of additional coordination bodies 
at the national level was advised against by the BE actors. 
Learning-by-doing approach to climate finance reporting: to improve CF reporting by all BE 
actors even those that are not currently reporting on their flows, it was suggested to adopt a 
“learning-by-doing” approach. Despite existing data problems and methodological challenges, 
BE actors are all encouraged to take part in climate finance reporting for the next reporting 
period (2016 flows, to be reported around August 2017 through BR and NC). They will receive 
critical feedback from technical expert reviews that can help them improve their measurement 
and reporting experience over time. 
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3 |  Policy guidance and support on climate finance 
reporting: case of Delcredere- Ducroire (Credendo)10  
 Background of the case study  
In November 2016, BeFinD researchers met with representatives of Credendo to provide policy 
guidance and support on their future climate finance reporting efforts. The objective of the 
meeting was threefold:  
1) To gain a better understanding of Delcredere’s activities and products relevant to climate 
financing.   
2) To assess Delcredere’s specific risks of overestimation and double counting.  
3) to support and advise Delcredere on which methods and approaches to use to track and 
report their climate-relevant flows in ways that best reduce the risks of overestimation and 
double-counting, taking into account confidentiality constraints.  
While the research mandate of this current BeFinD project is limited to the topic of public 
climate finance provided to developing countries by BE actors, BeFinD researchers decided to 
expand the mandate and focus on Delcredere’s role in the mobilisation of private climate finance 
to developing countries as well. This decision was driven mainly by the fact that on closer 
examination, Credendo might be solely active in the mobilisation of private finance. In this 
regard, Credendo could consider reporting its relevant financial information to DGD starting as 
early as next year (i.e. 2017), when Annex II country parties are expected to provide information 
on financial resources and transfer of technology both through their NCs and BRs, as well as 
through their yearly OECD DAC reporting. Note as well that Credendo will soon reform its 
internal reporting system to better reflect its current financial activities, possibly including their 
role in the mobilisation of climate-relevant flows in developing countries.   
Ms. Karine Boussart and Ms. Aurélie Laurent from Delcredere attended the meeting and 
provided valuable information about Credendo’s main activities, financial products, and climate-
relevant projects. Ms. Boussart’s main role at Delcredere is to keep up with debates conducted 
within the framework of the OECD Arrangement on Export Credits so as to ensure Credendo’s 
compliance with the OECD key guiding principles and rules.
11
 Ms. Laurent for her part is 
responsible for assessing the environmental and social risks of projects and transactions for 
which applications of cover are received. 
 
10 The name Delcredere (in Dutch) and Ducroire (in French) has been in use since the creation of the organisation in the first half of 
the 20th century. Recently, it was decided to continue with only the name Credendo. Because most actors and people in Belgium 
still use the name Delcredere, we will use the old and the new name interchangeably. So whether we write Credendo or Delcredere, 
we are referring to the same organisation.   
11 As explained in more details in the previous BeFinD study: “Within this arrangement, ECAs aim at providing a level playing field 
and eliminating subsidies and trade distortions (OECD 2016). Within this arrangement, several export credits sector understandings 
have been negotiated, including on climate change mitigation and adaptation, renewable energy and water projects. If projects 
adhere to these categories, the usual (financial) standards of ECA’s can be more flexible. Additionally, the sector understanding on 
coal-fired electricity generation projects (CFSU) forbids ECA’s in participating in dirty-coal activities.” (see Van Dyck and Bachus 2016, 
p. 33).  
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 Reporting export credit insurance/guarantees in the context of climate 
finance  
Before describing Delcredere’s potential role in the provision and/or mobilisation of climate 
finance, it is important to briefly discuss how the instrument of export credit 
guarantees/insurances – the main financial instruments provided by Delcredere – are currently 
being treated in international climate finance reporting.  
As noted by the authors of a OECD-CPI report (2015, p. 16) in their estimates of international 
climate finance in 2013 and 2014, not many developed countries have thus far reported the 
climate-relevant activities of their official export credit agencies (ECAs). For instance, OECD 
statistics related to export credit activities were not included in the first biennial reports 
submitted in 2014 for the years 2011-2012. The non-reporting of export credit insurance and 
guarantees has a fundamental and a practical explanation.  
 Fundamental discussion  
Guarantees were not reported as they do not create north-south financial flows.
12
 They are 
either not paid out (and then there is no flow), or they are paid out (and then the flow goes from 
north to north and the recovery post hoc creates a south-north flow).  
Recently, the debate within the OECD has changed and guarantees will probably be reported 
in the future; the fact that there is no cash flow is not an exclusion criterion anymore.
13
 The 
reason of this OECD switch is because they want to incentivise the use of non-grant instruments 
(i.e. guarantees, equity, and mezzanine finance) because of their capacity to mobilise private 
finance (including private climate finance). In 2015, a group of 19 bilateral climate finance 
providers including Belgium, declared that their common definition of “mobilised private 
climate finance” will include the public finance provided by export credit agencies.
14
  
The question whether concessionality will be a condition in the future for including guarantees 
in public climate finance, has not received a clear and consensus answer yet on the international 
level.  
  
 
12 See OECD 2014b, p.1.  
13 See especially OECD 2014a; 2014b; 2014c, 2015 and 2016.  
14
 Joint Statement on Tracking Progress Towards the $100 billion Goal by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States, and the European Commission (Group of 19 bilateral climate finance providers, 2015). URL: 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/246878.pdf.  
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 Technical difficulties 
Public climate finance: 
Reporting on export credit insurances/guarantees to the UNFCCC is technically challenging. First, 
unlike grants or loans, guarantees do not necessarily involve a financial payout or outflow, which 
make them difficult to measure or value under the dominant cash face value method.  
Increasing efforts are currently undertaken at the OECD DAC to adequately quantify/measure 
the provider effort (grant equivalent) in using private sector instruments such as guarantees, 
mezzanine finance, and equity (See Bachus and Bécault, 2017). While the provider effort to 
extend guarantees is not easily quantifiable, some options to measure the effort can include: 
risk taken by the guarantor, claims eventually paid in case of default, capital subscription to the 
agency issuing guarantees, or the difference between the guarantee fee charged by the public 
institution and the guarantee fee charged at market rates (concessionality).15 
Mobilised private climate finance: 
In regard to mobilised private finance, it is clear that guarantees can play a significant 
mobilisation role. However, under the UNFCCC there is currently no agreed methodology on 
how to value the private climate finance mobilised by such mechanisms. Meanwhile, progress 
has been made within the OECD DAC: the DAC secretariat conducted a number of surveys on 
guarantee schemes for development and initiated methodological work to measure the 
amounts mobilised from the private sector by this mechanism (and other instruments such as 
syndicated loans and shares in collective investment vehicles.)
16
 As we will see below, four main 
valuation methods can be used for assessing the amount of private finance mobilised by a 
guarantee for a private loan:  
(1) The total cost of the project (contract amount);  
(2) The entire face value of the loan (credit amount) or amount of the private finance 
covered by the guarantee irrespective of the percentage covered – this is the attribution 
method proposed by the OECD DAC;  
(3) The amount covered by the guarantee 
(4) The amount based on the net exposure of the guarantee, this is an estimate of the value 
of the risk taken by the guarantor. Overall, investigating how publicly-backed guarantees 
can be included in mobilised public climate finance requires developing a specific 
methodology to track the climate-relevance of these instruments and conducting a 
more detailed investigation on how export credit guarantees (especially co-guarantees) 
actually mobilise private finance in developing countries.   
The options are ordered in descending order of amounts: 
 
Net exposure       <       amount guaranteed       <       credit amount       <       contract amount 
 
15 See especially Mirabile et al. (2013) which provided a report for the OECD on the use of guarantees in external development 
finance.   
16 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/guarantees-for-development.htm.   
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 Explaining Delcredere’s activities  
Credendo is an autonomous government institution and is Belgium’s public export credit agency 
(ECA); it is also mandated to grant state guarantees. It is operational worldwide, with most of its 
insured risks being in developing countries.  It aims at stable financial returns in compliance with 
WTO regulations. Delcredere neither has a specific development-related nor an 
environmentally-related mission. Its mission is to promote international economic relations. 
Credendo’s main operations can be divided into two sets of activities:  
1) Insuring and providing guarantees
17
 for Belgian activities: insure Belgian companies and 
banks against the political and/or commercial risks associated with their foreign commercial 
transactions, mainly regarding capital goods and industrial projects, as well as contracted works 
and services. Delcredere can for instance provide an insurance to a bank that finances an 
exporter’s buyer. In this instance, the bank is insured against the risks of non-payment by the 
foreign client. Some insurance contracts do not involve any bank but only an exporter/service 
provider that provides a credit (by accepting late payment) to his buyer; the exporter is then 
insured against the risks of non or late payment. Sometimes, the exporter will build 
infrastructure in a third country, and the service contract is divided into phases. A new phase 
will only be started when the previous phase is paid. The non-payment of the due sums and the 
contract termination can be covered by the Delcredere insurance. 
Three types of export credit activities can be distinguished: 
a. Export credit insurance is Delcredere’s main instrument and the most relevant in the 
context of climate financing. The provision of a guarantee can indeed help incentivise 
exporters and banks to execute climate-related projects or exports to developing 
countries.  
b. Investment covers: insure BE exporters against the political risks for foreign investments 
in host countries. This product makes out a smaller share of Delcredere’s activity and is 
highly volatile.  
c. Financial guarantees: provide a guarantee to a bank that grants a loan to a BE company 
with the ambition to export in the future (the bank is the beneficiary).  
In a nutshell, climate finance reporting should target export insurance, being the most used and 
most relevant product.   
2) Market Window activities whereby Delcredere works alongside banks through risk sharing 
schemes.   
It was concluded during the interview that only the activities of Delcredere related to Belgian 
companies are relevant for climate finance. Market Window activities do not play a role in the 
mobilisation of private finance (the financing being private).  
 
17 Although technically not entirely identical, in this working paper we use the terms ‘guarantees’ and ‘insurance’ interchangeably.  
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Next to the main instruments of insurance and guarantees, Delcredere also provides direct 
lending to SMEs. 
Next to the main instruments of insurance and guarantees, Credendo also offers small amounts 
for direct lending to SMEs, but much less than many other ECAs such as in the US and or Canada. 
Financial flows associated with export credit guarantees
18
  
 
The flowcharts hereunder illustrate the financial flows associated with Credendo’s provision of 
an export credit guarantee. In the financing, either the exporter grants a payment delay to his 
client (supplier credit) or the bank does (buyer credit).   
 
Figure 1 shows the contractual construction without involvement of a bank, and figure 2 with 
involvement of a bank. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Financial flows associated with the provision of export credit insurance without 
involvement of a bank 
 
       
  
 
18 This part is based on an oral presentation provided by representatives of Credendo. 
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Figure 2.  Financial flows associated with the provision of export credit insurance with 
involvement of a bank 
 
 
 
 Delcredere’s role in public climate financing  
Because the guarantees provided by Credendo do not generate a flow, the interviewees tend to 
consider that Credendo is not active in public climate finance. Indeed, up to now guarantees 
have not been included in public finance reporting because of this reason (see section 3.2). 
However, the debate on the international level is changing, and export credit insurance and 
guarantees will probably be tracked as public climate finance in the future. As this debate is not 
settled yet, it is wise to be cautious and conservative with the reporting for the time being.  
In the absence of consensus at the international and national levels, it is up to the reporting 
states to decide or not to include export credit insurance and guarantees in public climate 
finance reporting.  
At this stage, and as agreed with Credendo experts, we suggest not to include the flows in public 
climate finance reporting, for the following reasons.   
a) Credendo does not have a specific development-related objective;  
b) Credendo operates at premium rates for all its activities, so no concessionality is 
present.
19
 
c) In most cases a guarantee does not lead to any financial flow. Only when the 
‘debtor’, who is a public or private actor in a developing country, does not pay its 
 
19 Note that these two criteria (i.e. development objective and concessionality) are of course most relevant in the context of 
development finance (OECD DAC). As mentioned already earlier, there is under the UNFCCC no clear /common definition of what 
should constitute public climate finance. As a result, the question whether concessionality is a condition for (especially public) 
climate finance is not fully sorted out yet.   
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debt to the (Belgian) bank or the (Belgian) exporter, the guarantee will lead to a 
flow. But that flow is from Credendo to the Belgian bank or exporter, so north-
north. And afterwards, Credendo will still claim the money back from the actor in 
the developing country, which is a south-north flow. So no signs of any north-south 
flow.  
d) There is no agreed methodology yet for estimating the value of the donor effort for 
export credit insurance and guarantees yet.  
 Delcredere’s role in the mobilisation of private climate finance  
 Introduction  
To estimate the amount of private climate finance mobilised by Credendo, it is necessary to 
determine how to assess and substantiate how Credendo’s provision of export credit insurances 
actually mobilises private finance in developing countries.  
There is at present no internationally agreed methodology for measuring and reporting 
mobilised private climate finance. Methodological options and choices are however currently 
being explored especially by the OECD DAC Research collaborative on Tracking Private Climate 
Finance 
20
which in recent years has developed and started to apply a methodological framework 
(the 4-stage framework) structured around four sequential but interrelated decisional stages:  
1. defining public and private climate finance  
2. scoping private finance accounting boundaries  
3. assessing causality between public and private finance 
4. deciding on an attribution method (esp. where multiple actors are involved).   
In regard to methodological choices and decisions, Delcredere is prepared to adopt a 
conservative approach so as to avoid risks of double-counting and overestimations of flows, 
both in terms of causality assumptions and attribution methods.   
Up to now, concessionality is not considered to be a condition for private finance qualification 
under the UNFCCC framework.  
In the remainder of this section, we will apply the four steps of the 4-stage framework to the 
case of Delcredere.   
 
20 As mentioned already, this research group is a OECD-hosted consortium of experts from international financial institutions, the 
private sector, governments, and non-governmental organizations that is working to develop tools for more accurately tracking 
mobilized private climate finance. See the Research Collaborative’s website for further information: 
https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative.  
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 Step1: defining public and private climate finance  
In classifying what constitutes public vs. private climate finance, actors generally follow the 
OECD DAC definition, to determine if an entity is private or public. The OECD DAC’s definition of 
public finance (“official flows”) for reporting ODA is as follows:  “Official transaction are those 
undertaken by central, state or local government agencies at their own risk and responsibility, 
regardless of whether these agencies have raised the funds through taxation or through 
borrowing from the private sector. This includes transactions by public corporations, i.e. 
corporation over which the government secures control by owning more than half of the voting 
equity securities or otherwise controlling more than half of the equity holders’ voting power; or 
through special legislation empowering the government to determine corporate policy or to 
appoint directors.”
21
 Although the distinction between public and private entities is sometimes 
more complex than that, we propose here to follow this OECD definition based on the 
shareholder structure as a basic rule: if more than 50% of the shareholders are public, the entity 
is considered public.  
 Step 2: scoping private finance accounting boundaries  
Credendo, in its provision of export credit insurances, can be said to be active in the mobilisation 
of private climate finance to developing countries. These products indeed allow Belgian 
companies to invest or export to developing countries with high levels of political risks and both 
Ms. Boussart and Laurent consider that the export or investment would often not have taken 
place/not be feasible without the insurance provided by Credendo. Therefore, it can be 
considered as mobilised. 
 Step 3: assessing causality between public and private finance  
Assessing the causality between public interventions and private finance is a very complex 
endeavour and there are currently no clear methodological options. The best evidence of 
causality is the private cofinancing method referring to a situation whereby public and private 
actors are cofinancing a project from an early stage. In regard to Credendo activities this is 
mostly the case in the few instances whereby Finexpo together with a commercial bank provides 
credit to the foreign local government (‘the buyer’) to support a Belgian company exporting its 
products and services to a developing country. In Finexpo loans as well, Credendo often 
guarantees (part of) the payment from the local government in a developing country to the 
Belgian company, thereby helping to mitigate the political and commercial risks for the 
exporting company. However, as suggested by Ms. Boussart and Ms. Laurent, not many of 
Credendo’s projects are related to Finexpo (only a few projects in the last three years). But when 
Finexpo is involved, Credendo tends to have far more information on the type of projects being 
financed.  
 
21 OECD, “Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire”, 
11 June 2013, p. 7 
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After deliberation, it was concluded that the fact that Credendo offers a guarantee for a project 
is to some extent a crucial pre-condition to the realisation of the transaction, although it is not 
always possible to calculate how big the impact is exactly. In practice, it can be quite complex to 
demonstrate that private financiers would not been involved without the official intervention of 
Credendo. At this stage, it was advised not to report on projects where the causal relationship 
between Credendo and private finance cannot be clearly established. This is a pragmatic 
approach, not a fundamental one, as more climate-relevant investments by Credendo are likely 
to have at least some causal impact on the total investment decision. As a result, only for the 
projects in which Finexpo provides a loan and Credendo provides the guarantee, the causality is 
considered proven.  
 Step 4: deciding on an attribution method 
In the case of a guarantee to a private loan, the OECD DAC proposes to attribute the amount of 
private finance (loan, equity) covered by a publicly-backed guarantee as being fully mobilised by 
the guarantee, irrespectively of the percentage covered.
22
 Applying this attribution 
methodology, however, can have a substantial weighting impact on the mobilisation figures (see 
box 3). As shown by the Trinomics study (2015), such a method can double or triple the total 
amount of mobilised private climate finance by Belgium.  
In the absence of clear practices for weighting the amount of private finance mobilised by 
guarantees, Delcredere accepted to value the amount of mobilised private finance on the basis 
of the amount covered by their insurance (i.e. Delcredere’s commitment, see box 3 for an 
example with numbers and section 3.2.2 for more background). Ms. Boussart and Ms. Laurent 
both agreed that this is a relatively conservative approach (more conservative than the 
calculation based on the entire face value of the credit (credit amount), or the total cost of the 
project (contract amount), but less conservative than the calculation based on the net exposure 
which is not always easy to determine). It is also a method that is easy to calculate.   
  
 
22 See OECD-DAC (2016). This is what we called the ‘credit amount’ in section 3.2.2. 
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Box 3: Example on how to quantify the private climate finance mobilised by Credendo’s 
provision of an export credit insurance.  
A fictitious project
23
 (see figure 3) from a Belgian exporter in Kenya with the Kenyan government 
as the client, has a total contract value of € 1 bio;  
The Kenyan government gets a loan from a Belgian bank worth € 100 mio; the other € 900 mio 
are financed with other means. The credit value is € 100 mio. 
Credendo grants a guarantee to the Belgian bank for 95% of that loan; i.e. € 95 mio, which is the 
value insured. 
Taking into account all the parameters of the insurance, the risk Credendo takes is valued at 
€ 35 mio; this is the net exposure.  
Figure 3. Valuing Credendo’s mobilised private finance 
 
In this example (if climate-relevance is important and causality is established) € 95 mio will be 
reported as mobilized private climate finance. 
To avoid risks of double-counting, it was agreed that in case ECAs from other countries are 
involved, Credendo should not report on mobilised private finance. When information is 
available and when a few ECAs are involved, a pro-rata approach is ultimately possible. 
Delcredere should also not report when other public multilateral institutions (such as the EIB) 
are involved because those are already reporting on their level. In addition, it was agreed that 
Delcredere can report for both public and private buyers, as long as the activity is taking place 
in a developing country. Finally, when Finexpo is involved, Finexpo and Delcredere should 
coordinate their reporting efforts so as to minimize obvious risks of double counting/reporting 
to DGD and or FPS Environment.  
 
23 In this example, the role of Finexpo is left out to avoid complexity.  
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  Tracking climate-relevant projects: the Rio Markers  
Delcredere | Ducroire conducts an assessment of the environmental and social impacts of all 
the projects/transactions for which application of cover are received. This impact assessment 
process is made in accordance with different international standards like the Performance 
Standards of the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and is grounded in the OECD 
“Recommendation on Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits and 
Environmental  and Social Due Diligence” which requires ECA to review projects for their 
potential environmental and social impacts and to benchmark them against international 
standards, such as those of the World Bank Group.  
Credendo‘s impact analysis is a multi-step process involving: 1) the screening of applications 
to check among other things, whether or not the project is taking place in an environmentally 
sensitive area. If there is no need to classify a transaction, it will be given the code N (No 
classification).  2) A project classification process which classifies projects according to three 
main categories:  
 Category A: a project is classified as category A if it has the potential the potential 
to have significant adverse environmental impacts. Category A, in principle, 
includes projects in sensitive sectors or located in or near sensitive areas.  
 Category B: a project is classified as category B if its potential environmental 
impacts are less adverse than those of category A projects. Typically, these impacts 
are site-specific, few if any of them are irreversible.  
 Category C: a project is classified as category C, if it is likely to have minimal or no 
adverse environmental impacts.  
The evaluation of climate change effects or challenges is part of the Credendo due diligence 
process, meaning that climate change is just one of many environmental risks evaluated. The 
approach used by Delcredere focuses on risks rather than on the environmental benefits of 
projects. During the interview, questions were raised about which approach should be used and 
whether Credendo should adopt a restrictive vs. broad interpretation of climate relevance: 
- report only what they support according to the Renewable sector understanding of the 
OECD arrangement (very restrictive); 
- report what is strictly climate; 
- or report based on a larger interpretation of climate change relevance.  
We advised Credendo to use the Rio markers handbook which, in its most recent version, 
usefully provides detailed information about the climate-relevance of specific projects and 
activities across sectors (i.e. transport, renewable energy, waste management…). Moreover, we 
advised Credendo to follow the existing unwritten Belgian rule to adopt a conservative attitude 
when applying the Rio markers, meaning that in case of not fully-convincing arguments or 
doubts between two Rio Markers, always the lower score will be granted. Finally, we see it as 
logical if Credendo would follow the federal (i.e. DGD) approach where the weighing method is 
concerned.  
Credendo suggested that they would like to involve their clients, big Belgian industrial 
companies, in the thinking on climate change and export financing. In this regard, they offered 
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the researchers to join them in organizing a seminar for their clients explaining how they can 
raise the climate relevance of their exporting projects. We see the proposal for this seminar as 
a unique opportunity for increasing the climate (finance) awareness of a number of very 
powerful, very relevant, and (often) very unaware industrial actors. Explorations are currently 
being done to put the idea for this workshop into practice. 
  Anonymity and confidentiality  
Anonymity and confidentiality remain important issues for Credendo, and a requirement that 
needs to be met before they will agree to report. Therefore, we proposed them to only report 
their climate flows on an aggregate level, meaning that they will probably not deliver project-
level lines for the DGD excel database on climate flows, but rather one figure (or a couple) 
describing the total Credendo climate flows. If this approach is followed, we advise a system of 
external verification, e.g. by a consultant or an independent expert.  
  Summary of findings for Delcredere’s climate finance reporting  
Scope of climate financing:  
Our assessment of Delcredere’s role in climate financing shows that Delcredere via its provision 
of export credit insurances, can be said at this point to be only active in the mobilisation of 
private climate finance. Guarantees are an effective and attractive instrument to mobilise 
private climate finance, however there is as yet no agreed methodology on how to report the 
private finance mobilised by such mechanism.  
Causality assessments:  
In the absence of adequate methodologies and agreed framework, we advised Credendo to 
adopt a conservative approach when evaluating the causal impacts of their guarantees and in 
measuring the amount of private finance mobilised.  
Risks of double-counting:  
When other ECAs and multilateral institutions such as the European Investment Bank are 
involved, we advised Delcredere not to report so as to avoid potential risks of double-counting. 
When Delcredere and Finexpo are both involved in the mobilisation of private finance, 
Delcredere and Finexpo need to coordinate their reporting efforts to minimise the risks of 
double counting the same private flow.   
Risks of over-estimation of flows:   
Over-estimation of private climate finance mobilised by Credendo’s guarantees can occur when 
the attribution method is based on the entire credit amount, the contract amount, or on the 
total cost of the project. While the calculation based on the net exposure amount is the most 
conservative method, it is difficult to calculate and can be too restrictive. We proposed at this 
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stage that Credendo report only the amount of private finance insured (covered) by the 
guarantee.   
Tracking the climate-relevance of Delcredere’s projects  
Delcredere’s environmental and social risks assessment approach has a limited focus on climate 
change. It also tends to focus on risks rather than benefits. Delcredere has no experience yet in 
applying the Rio markers. In this regard, we advised Delcredere to use the Rio Markers 
conservatively, and to use the DGD weighting method. It was proposed in the future to 
incentivise Delcredere’s clients in identifying and promoting the climate relevance of their 
projects.  
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Annex 1: Climate finance providers in Belgium  
Many public actors/agencies in Belgium have climate-relevant flows. The following tables 
provide an overview of the actors relevant to this study and how each have been integrated in 
the two previous studies on public climate finance in Belgium (Van Dyck and Bachus 2016; and 
Trinomics 2015). 
Actors in development cooperation 
Table 0.1 - Actors in development cooperation 
 Description Instruments/projects/
actions 
Relevance to previous studies on CF in Belgium 
DGD  
- 100% public 
- Federal  
- Main coordinator of 
climate finance 
reporting in BE  
- Under the authority 
of FSP Foreign affairs, 
Foreign Trade and 
Development 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
- Grants, all reported as 
ODA  
- Explicit climate change 
and environmental 
objective  
 
- BeFinD (2016):  
DGD is currently main provider of the BE climate 
finance; coordinates climate finance reporting for BE. 
Provided the full details of the data needed together 
with the reporting tables that were used during the 
UNFCCC BR in 2014.   
- Trinomics (2015):  
Capacity building and policy support. Potential to 
mobilise private climate finance. Provides finance to 
NGOs and multilateral institutions that work with the 
private sector.  
BTC
24
 
- 100% public 
- Federal  
- Under the authority 
of FPS Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Trade and 
Development, Federal 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation.  
- Only ODA grants used 
for capacity building and 
technical assistance.  
 
- BeFinD (2016): Not covered by the study because  
data is included in the DGD data.  
- Trinomics (2015): Although it may not be an 
objective, the policy support provided by BTC or some 
specific policies implemented may 
lead to future mobilisation of private finance 
BIO
25
 
- 100% public 
- Federal  
-Management 
contract with the 
Belgian State  
- Non-concessional loans, 
equity, technical 
assistance and feasibility 
studies. The loans are 
provided at market 
terms, but in cases where 
-  BeFinD (2016):  
Relevance: In the future,  BIO is expected to become 
an important actor to contribute to the Belgian 
climate finance reporting, because it has an explicit 
 
24 Belgian Development Agency 
25 The Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries. For more information on BIO see: http://www.bio-
invest.be/en/about-us/mission.html 
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commercial loans are not 
accessible or available.  
 
development focus and a clear focus on renewable 
energy projects.  
Data: BIO has provided partial data, mainly on an 
aggregated level. However, due to time constraints 
and the current lack of a quick method to extract 
the climate finance data from their project 
database, BIO’s flows were not included in the 
database.  
- Trinomics (2015):  
BIO often co-invests with other public and/or private 
parties. When it co-invests with private parties, it 
mobilises private finance directly.  
Flemish 
Department of 
Foreign Affairs 
(Internatio-naal 
Vlaan-deren) 
 
 
-1-  - 100% public  
- Regional-Flanders  
- Under the authority 
of the Minister-
President of Flanders 
- Grants, all ODA.  - Befind (2016)  
Relevance: Internationaal Vlaanderen is already an 
important actor to contribute to the Belgian climate 
finance reporting, and this importance may 
increase further in the near future, as the 
contributions of the three regions to Belgian 
climate finance is expected to rise in the future.  
Data: Internationaal Vlaanderen provided full data and 
also published their whole database on climate 
finance on their website.  
- Trinomics (2015)  
Flanders Foreign Affairs’ instruments are focussed on 
capacity building and policy support. It has the potential 
to mobilise private finance indirectly over time.  
Wallonia-
Brussels 
International 
(WBI) 
- 100% public  
- Regional- Wallonia-
Brussels  
- Under the authority 
of the Prime Minister 
of the Federation of 
Wallonia Brussels  
- Grants, Other Official 
Flows (OOF) 
- Behind (2016)  
Relevance: as the main organisation responsible for 
development cooperation policies from the French 
speaking region, WBI is a relevant climate finance 
provider.  
Data: Wallonie-Bruxelles International delivered 
detailed data to the researchers, which were then 
included in the reporting. It was the first time that 
this organisation reported its climate finance in 
such a detailed way.  
- Trinomics (2015)  
WBI’s instruments are focused on local capacity building 
and development and could directly mobilise private 
climate finance.  
Actors in environment and climate change  
Table 0.2 - Actors in environment and climate change 
 Description Instruments/projects/ 
actions 
Relevance to previous studies on CF in Belgium 
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FPS (Federal 
Public 
Service)  
Environment  
- 100% public 
- Federal  
- Main coordinator of 
climate finance 
reporting in BE  
- Under the authority 
of Federal Public 
Service, Food Chain 
Safety and 
Environment, Federal 
Minister for 
Environment  
 
- Projects, consultancies, 
Technical Support  
 
- BeFinD (2016): 
Relevance: FPS Environment is especially relevant for its 
role in coordinating and monitoring intra-Belgian 
Climate action, and in their participation in the 
international climate negotiations. Their current 
own climate finance budgets are limited, but they 
remain an important coordinating actor.  
Data: The FPS has provided data on their climate 
projects in developing countries, but they were 
already known and included in current databases. 
Their own climate finance budgets are quite low.  
- Trinomics (2015):  
FPS Environment’s instruments are focused on policy 
and the public sector, but could indirectly mobilise 
private climate finance through multilateral 
channels.  
Environment 
Nature and 
Energy (LNE)  
- 100 % public  
- regional (Flanders)  
- Minister for 
Environment of 
Flanders  
- Grants (ODA), most is 
multilateral ODA 
 
- Befind (2016)  
Relevance: The International department of LNE is very 
active in the discussions on accounting and 
reporting methodologies of climate finance. 
Moreover, it is a significant provider of climate 
finance through its current project work and the 
Partnership for Water for Development. 
Data: The climate finance flows originating from LNE are 
included in the Flemish database on climate 
finance. The researchers received additional data 
on co-financing from other public Belgian actors in 
the context of the Partnership Water for 
Development.  
- Trinomics (2015)  
LNE does not have a private sector objective but could 
indirectly mobilise private finance through its 
multilateral channels.   
 
Walloon 
Agency for 
Air and 
Climate 
(AWAC)  
- 100% public  
- Regional/Wallonia  
- Under the authority 
of the Walloon 
Minister for Energy 
and Walloon Minister 
for Environment 
- Grants, currently reported 
as OOF  
- Befind (2016)  
Relevance: as the main Walloon climate finance 
provider and responsible administration, AWAC is 
the main contact point with regard to climate 
finance in the Walloon region.  
Data: researchers received detailed data from AWAC 
which was included in research.  
-Trinomics (2015)  
The AWAC’s instruments are focused on policy and the 
public sector, but could indirectly mobilise private 
climate finance through multilateral channels.  
Brussels 
Environment  
- 100% public 
- Regional/Brussels 
- Grants reported as OOF  - Befind (2016)  
Relevance: Their competences on  environmental policy 
make them a relevant actor.  
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- Brussels’ minister 
for Environment  
Data: Brussels Environment provided data on their 
activities. Apart from the multilateral finance which 
was already included in the biennial reporting, no 
new climate relevant flows were reported for the 
period 2013-2014.  
- Trinomics (2015)  
Potential of direct mobilisation is limited for now, but 
could increase in the future through contributions 
to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the 
Adaptation Fund (AF) as well as bilateral projects 
with African cities.  
Actors in finance, export & investment  
Table 0.3 - Actors in finance, export & investment 
 Description Instruments/projects/ 
actions 
Relevance to previous studies on CF in 
Belgium 
FINEXPO 
- 100% public 
- Federal  
- Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Minister 
of Finance.  
 
 
Finexpo uses four instruments:  
(1) state to state loans  
a) Tied loans which are 
combined with a commercial 
credit, those loans are 
requested by Belgian 
companies. 
b) Untied loans requested by 
developing countries 
involving an international 
tendering process. 
2. Bonifications: de interests of 
commercial credits are paid, by 
Finexpo, mostly in combination 
with a grant from 
Finexpo in order a grant 
element of 35%. 
3. Grants granted by Finexpo 
amounting to 35% of the 
contract amount of a 
commercial credit with a 
maximum 
of EUR 2,2 million. 
4. Stabilizations: the interests of 
commercial loans are 
“stabilized” by Finexpo so that 
companies can benefit 
 
 
- BeFinD (2016): 
Relevance: Finexpo is considered an important actor 
to contribute to the Belgian climate finance 
reporting, as their climate flows are already 
important today. Need some clarifications 
about their role in future climate finance 
activities and reporting.   
Data: All activities from FInexpo counts as ODA and 
they are already included in ODA as well as in 
the DGD database. However for reasons of 
confidentiality the data are only provided on an 
aggregated level. Missing data from Finexpo 
was the detailed modalities of the loans (type of 
repayment, interest rate, maturity, grace 
period, agreed discount rate etc.). For that 
reason the researchers were not able to 
calculate the grant equivalent of the loans.  
- Trinomics (2015):  
Significant direct mobilisation: state-to-state loans 
are usually coupled with a private loan which in 
practice provides 41-to 50% of the total finance, 
and interest subsidies have an estimated 
leverage rate of 2.86%.  
DELCREDERE
/DUCROIRE  
- 100% public  
- Federal  
- Guarantees (export credit 
assurance)  
- Befind (2016)  
Relevance: potentially important actor to contribute 
to climate finance reporting in Belgium because 
of the complementary with the Finexpo loans 
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- Autonomous body 
with a  State 
Guarantee.  
for which Credendo issues guarantees. Need to 
approach them in order to clarify their role in 
future climate finance activities and reporting  
- Trinomics (2015)  
If Delcredere-Ducroire’s instruments are included in 
the measurements, the amount of mobilised 
private climate finance by Belgium in 2013-2014 
will increase fourfold.  
Flanders 
Investment 
and Trade 
(FIT)  
- 100% public  
- Regional – Flanders  
- Minister of Flanders  
- Advisory services, finance, OOF  
Three subsidy lines are 
important: 
- Subsidies for feasibility studies 
(FIT co finances 50% of 
feasibility studies by Flemish 
companies for economic 
activities abroad.  
-Subsidies for export of 
equipment.  
- Subsidies for international 
activities: mainly budgeting for 
international congresses, 
translation work, and 
prospection work.  
 - Befind (2016)  
Relevance: Although FIT does not have any 
development goals, their support mechanisms 
are expected to include a number of relevant 
development-related climate flows. FIT is not 
expected to be a main climate finance provider 
but could still be a source of climate finance 
through its funding mechanisms.  
Wallonia 
Foreign 
Trade and 
Investment 
and Agency 
(AWEX)  
- 100 % public  
- Regional/Wallonia  
- Under the authority 
of the Walloon 
Minister for Foreign 
Trade  
- Grants reported as OOF  - Befind (2016)  
Relevance: As for its Flemish counterpart, AWEX 
could possibly fund climate relevant activities 
through its instruments.  
Data: Data from AWEX not included due to time 
constraints.  
Trinomics (2015)  
Could potentially mobilise private finance directly if 
it has climate-relevant projects. Not climate 
objective nor climate marker system in place, data 
on private finance is confidential.   
Brussels 
Invest and 
Export  
- 100 % public  
- Regional/Brussels 
capital  
- Minister of 
Economy; foreign 
trade of the Brussels-
Capital Region  
- Grants which fall in the 
category of OOF  
Not covered by Befind (2016) study  
Trinomics (2015)  
Brussels Invest and Export supports the private 
sector in starting up activities in foreign countries, 
including countries in the South. If it has climate-
relevant projects, it could mobilise private finance 
directly. As the activities of the companies that 
benefit from B-I&E’s instruments are very broad and 
that B-I&E currently doesn’t collect data on this 
issue, it is very difficult to identify a causal link with 
private finance mobilised by its instruments.   
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Other actors  
Table 0.4 - Other actors 
 Description Instruments/projects/ 
actions 
Relevance to previous studies on CF in Belgium 
Belgian 
Corporation 
for 
international 
Investment 
(BMI/SBI)  
- Public/Private (63% 
public)  
- Equity, subordinated debt. Both 
instruments have a maturity of 5 
to 6 years. Per investment, BMI-
SBI can provide 500,000 to 5 
million euros.  
- BeFinD (2016):  
Relevance: BMI-SBI is a potentially important actor 
to contribute to Belgian climate finance 
reporting.  
Data: not provided any climate relevant flows for 
the period 2013-2014. They could have climate 
relevant flows in the future.  
- Trinomics (2015):  
The mobilisation potential of BMI-SBI is substantial. 
It currently has 25 projects in its portfolio 
totaling EUR 25 million. Data on co-finance by 
the Belgian companies is confidential. Does not 
have any climate relevant investments in its 
portfolio.  
Participatie 
Maatschappi
j Vlaanderen 
(PMV) 
Regional, Flanders  PMV collaborates with private 
partners via funds and public-
private partnerships. Particular 
emphasis is placed on sus-
tainable energy, biotech, clean 
tech, life sciences and infra-
structure. It manages a portfolio 
of EUR 900 million in assets.  
- BeFind (2016)  
PMV provided information on their activities. PMV 
flows are not currently relevant for climate 
finance; they are aimed at acquiring certified 
emission reductions  in developing countries. 
However PMV could be an important actor in 
the future.  
 
FWO 
(Research 
Foundation- 
Flanders)  
- 100% public  
- regional/Flanders  
 - Befind (2016)  
FWO could be relevant in providing climate finance 
through its international activities. Provided 
data on climate relevant flows.  
 
 
